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This paper reviews the complex and multifaceted adjustment pressures being 
experienced by Onslow, a small, remote town in Western Australia’s Pilbara due to a 
large gas development.  Some members of the community are enthusiastic about the 
opportunities that the gas industry will bring although the majority are wary of the 
negative impacts of rapid growth and corporate dominance observed in other Pilbara 
towns during the mining boom.  
The paper reports on the strategies being utilised by the company, the different spheres 
of government and the local community representatives to come to an agreement 
about how to achieve enduring community value so that the aesthetic attributes of the 
town and quality of life in Onslow will be enhanced, while also accommodating a large 
constructive workforce which will leave within a short time (four years).  Using data 
collected about the Pilbara and the socio-economic impacts of the mining industry on 
other towns, the lessons learned from rapid growth elsewhere were applied in Onslow 
and the outcomes assessed and reported. It is evident that the community engagement 
strategies and the collaborative planning processes have been undermined by 
disconnects between commercial imperatives, governance frameworks, investment risk 





Introduction and Background 
The Australian resources sector has experienced sustained growth since 2001, underpinned 
by demand from China for commodities creating boom conditions for the national economy 
which have continued, largely unabated, while many other economies have suffered 
recession (Bureau of Resources and Energy Economics 2012).  The extractive industries have 
been particularly important for the Western Australian economy (Western Australian 
Government 2012).  For most of the last decade iron-ore has been the most lucrative 
commodity export with the largest and richest deposits located in the remote Pilbara region 
of Western Australia (See Figure 1).   
Figure 1: The Pilbara Region of Western Australia showing four local government 
authorities  
  
Source: The Pilbara Regional Development Commission 2009 
Earlier in 2012, the iron-ore price began to slide back to 2009/10 prices and economic 
confidence was shaken as large projects such as port enlargements were stalled and 
companies announced retrenchments and halts on project expansions.  There were 
concerns that the significant investments made in the Pilbara by mining companies, support 
services companies and the government would be hit hard.  However, Western Australia is 
one of the most productive and diversified mineral regions in the world and while iron-ore 
and some other mineral resources declined in value, oil and gas markets remain buoyant. 
Market volatility is a hallmark of the resources industries and companies work quickly when 
they can to take advantage of markets and prices when they are high.   It was announced in 
2011 that Chevron would develop large gas reserves which have been identified off the 
Western Australian Pilbara coast.  While coal seam gas production is well established 
elsewhere, that industry has not been without considerable conflict with the agricultural 
industries and regional citizenry due to issues associated with noise, dust and the impacts of 
hydraulic fracturing (fracking) (Rolfe et al. 2007; Petkova et al. 2009).  The Western 
Australian gas industry on the other hand is different; the dominant resource is liquefied 
natural gas (LNG) from off-shore reserves which is refrigerated, and condensed into 




LNG is in high demand because it is a lower carbon emission alternative.  Western Australia 
has significant conventional gas reserves as shown in Figure 2.       
Figure 2: Australian Natural Gas Resources 
 
Source: Western Australian Department of Minerals and Petroleum 2012 (with permission) 
The North West Shelf gas project off the coast of Karratha was commissioned in 1984 and 
has contributed to building the town as a regional centre in the Pilbara.  Since then, several 
large scale LNG projects have been announced, including the Browse Basin, 60 kilometres 
north of Broome and the Carnarvon Basin off Onslow all of which are highly valued and 
expected to bring economic benefits, jobs and infrastructure to the State (Department of 
State Development 2011). Although the Pilbara region is an important hub for the resources 
extraction industries, it has a very small population with a few small towns and remote 
settlements scattered over very large distances.  Remoteness has presented a challenge for 
servicing and sustaining these towns and corporate investment has been important during 
successive resource booms. 
There have been numerous boom periods since the embargo on iron ore exports was lifted 
in 1959 (Battellino 2010; Measham et al. 2013 ) but until the 1970s, mining companies 




towns and communities servicing the nearby mining operations (Haslam McKenzie 2011). 
Increasingly towns have ‘normalised’ meaning they are no longer owned by a mining 
company and now have the usual governance structures of any other community with no 
restrictions regarding who can live there or do business in them (Thomas et al. 2006).   
Despite demand for housing, serviced land and services exceeding supply, government has 
been, until recently, reticent to release Crown Land for development purposes.   As early as 
1974 (Government of Western Australia Department of Industrial Development 1974) and 
many times since, (Department of Planning and Urban Development 1992; Ministry for 
Planning 1997) various petitions, housing and infrastructure assessments and government 
reports have identified the need to invest in the Pilbara towns (Pick et al. 2008; Haslam 
McKenzie et al. 2009; Lawrie et al. 2011).  Demand for accommodation, services and key 
workers has been unrelenting, pushing housing prices to unprecedented levels.  In the 
Pilbara the lack of housing and land supply has been a culmination of problems with native 
title, an unresponsive planning system, a State government unwilling to address the 
problem, a resources industry unable to inform planning authorities of anticipated demand 
and competition for skilled labour with the mining industry (Haslam McKenzie and Rowley 
2013).   
In 2008 a new Western Australian government was formed whose pivotal electoral 
commitment was a Royalties for Regions program which quarantined 25 per cent of the 
State’s mining and onshore petroleum royalties for additional investments in projects, 
infrastructure and community services in rural, regional and remote communities – over 
and above the State government service obligations (Department for Regional Development 
and Lands 2012).   A centrepiece of the Royalties for Regions program was the Pilbara Cities 
Blueprint, an ambitious plan to revitalise towns in the Pilbara capable of housing at least 
50,000 people and with amenities comparable to places such as Darwin and Cairns.  The 
towns identified for renewal were Karratha, Port Hedland and Newman.  Notably, even 
though new LNG projects off-shore from Onslow had been announced and committed, 
Pilbara Cities investment in the town was projected to be modest.  Despite considerable 
academic (Solomon et al. 2007; Haslam McKenzie et al. 2009; Hajkowicz et al. 2011; Lawrie 
et al. 2011) and public policy attention (Department of Treasury and Finance 2007; Senate 
Select Committee on Housing Affordability in Australia 2008; Department of Planning and 
Infrastructure 2009; Department for Regional Development and Lands 2012; House of 
Representatives Standing Committee on Regional Australia 2013) paid to the cost of poor 
planning for resource boom towns and rapid population growth, it appears that despite a 
long lead time and the projected growth, there is minimal projected public investment in 
Onslow.   
This paper will review the anticipated impacts of gas development in Onslow.  It will 
examine the strategies being utilised by the gas company, the different spheres of 




from the LNG investments while also preserving the aesthetic attributes of the town and the 
quality of life enjoyed by the small but longstanding population of Onslow.  It will assess 
whether the recommendations of numerous reports and studies from a variety of 
jurisdictions advocating improved preparedness for rapid growth and the socio-economic 
impacts of escalated resource company activities in rural, regional and remote locations 
have been adopted or applied in this particular community. 
The next section will discuss the merits of regional investment in remote communities 
where growth has been prompted by high value resource extraction, in light of the 
conflicting arguments regarding the ‘resources curse’ and enduring community value which 
could be derived from mining.  The recent experiences of the Pilbara will then be reviewed 
within the context of prolonged growth pressures prompted by high commodity prices and 
the ensuing socio-economic consequences experienced by a range of residents, businesses 
and workers.  A variety of policy responses to the pressures and subsequent regional 
development strategies will also be appraised. 
Next, the town of Onslow will be introduced in more detail; its current role as a Pilbara town 
and its intended development as a gas hub.  Qualitative data from a variety of sources will 
be discussed to gain an understanding of whether new policies and strategies to ensure that 
regional economic development are able to proceed in a timely manner in concert with 
community and corporate plans.  These will include public consultation reports and planning 
documents, the Minutes of the Onslow Community Reference Group and information from 
face to face interviews over the planning and early construction phases.   They will be 
examined to develop an understanding of the community’s preparedness for change and 
gain insight to their expectations and level of resilience.  This includes an assessment of the 
community’s social and physical resources and the capacity and willingness to develop as a 
resource hub town.   
The final section will discuss whether the lessons learned from other communities, 
particularly those in other parts of the Pilbara region which have experienced rapid growth, 
have been applied in Onslow. The outcomes will be assessed and reported. 
The Costs and Benefits of Resource Development: a brief review  
There is considerable literature debating the local and regional costs and benefits of 
resource development, particularly around the resources industries.  Much has been written 
about the ‘resource curse’ and the ‘paradox of plenty’, suggesting that a dependence on 
mining is often associated with slower economic growth (after controlling for the usual 
determinant of growth) due to uneven social and economic benefits, unstable institutional 
and political systems and marginalisation of minority groups and the environment in the 
midst of resource abundance (Freudenburg 1992; Auty 1993; Humphreys et al. 2007).  It has 
been argued that countries that specialise in primary products are prone to suffer Dutch 




conjecture whether an abundance of natural resources is a blessing or a boon for local 
socio-economic development (Davis and Tilton 2005; Maconachie and Binns 2007; Pineda 
and Rodriguez 2010).  There have also been counter arguments which show that ‘rich 
countries’ such as Canada, Norway and Germany have benefited from natural resource 
wealth due to well-designed public policy and strong institutions and institutional 
frameworks (Davis and Tilton 2005; Larsen 2005; Brunnschweiler 2008; Brunnschweiler and 
Bulte 2008).   
Gilmore (1976, p. 535) stated that “the energy boom town in western United States is apt to 
be a bad place to live  and a bad place to do business” because inevitably, there will be 
unmanaged growth which results in a “cumulative result of many different corporate, 
governmental and individual decisions, mostly made in isolation from each other, …. And 
which are the source of upsets and conflict”.  Although public policy analysts and prominent 
economists (Deloitte 2010; Edwards 2011; Sheehan 2011; Taylor et al. 2012) argue that 
Australia has not been a victim of Dutch Disease or the resource curse, the Australian 
experience has, in many remote areas, been as dire as Gilmore claims.   During boom times 
when there is high demand for raw materials and global markets are paying high prices, 
towns near to resource developments are often under considerable housing, infrastructure 
and services pressure with a sudden influx of population and businesses supporting the 
resources industries.  As a consequence there is competition for housing and labour and the 
scale of the large mining companies can have a significant and damaging effect on these 
communities which struggle to retain non-resource businesses, key workers associated with 
health, education, policing and childcare, casual labour and the essential services that make 
a community liveable (Haslam McKenzie et al. 2009).   
Australian governments and policy makers have been mindful of the risks of ‘too much 
wealth’ and applied political and monetary interventions in an endeavour to redistribute the 
proceeds of resource wealth across the economy (Conley 2011; Edwards 2011).  Continuous 
growth and a sustained resources boom have improved Australia’s fiscal position and terms 
of trade immeasurably since the 1980s (Reserve Bank of Australia 2009).  Public 
management of national wealth has been astute with macroeconomic stability and the 
benefits being dispersed widely across the national economy (Stevens 2011).  Over the last 
decade, there has been growth in employment and real household disposable incomes 
throughout Australia with “average real income gains to mining state residents only 
moderately greater than those accruing to residents of other states.  Much of the surge in 
mining-related incomes has been distributed elsewhere through mining company 
shareholdings and increased Commonwealth tax revenues” (Garton 2008, p. 9).  It appears 
however, that while Australia has competent institutions and strong fiscal and legal 
frameworks with broad benefits, the public policy frameworks have struggled to manage 
prosperity at the micro-scale, especially in remote and regional locations where resources 
extraction has reached unprecedented levels.   In the past, governments have been 




policies since the 1980s have not favoured public spending on communities such as remote 
towns near to resource operations, which are presumed to be there principally for the 
purpose of servicing large, multi-national resources companies.  Instead, the Western 
Australian government has devised State Agreements between the government and 
proponents of major resource projects which are ratified by an Act of State Parliament.  
State Agreements outline the terms and conditions of a project and outline the framework 
for ongoing investment and operational obligations thus ensuring some continuity and 
agreed procedural guidelines. 
The degree of remoteness of a community appears to have some influence over the 
(un)willingness of governments to spend on infrastructure, services and community 
development.  The Australian Bureau of Statistics has developed a Remoteness Structure 
based on the Accessibility/Remoteness Index of Australia (ARIA) scores (Australian Bureau 
of Statistics 2010). Generally it is assumed that ‘remote’ is four hours’ or more drive from an 
urban centre. ‘Very remote’ is usually more than four hours’ drive from a range of services 
and is generally inaccessible by ordinary car, implying a non-bitumen road.  There has been 
a general assumption of successive governments since 1983 that the supply of resources is 
finite and investment in infrastructure and housing for small communities is not an efficient 
use of public monies.  Consequently, governments have looked to resource companies for 
the provision of key infrastructure such as potable water, energy supply, waste 
management and roads as well as significant investment in housing stock, health and 
education facilities, local government projects and town beautification programs (Cheshire 
et al. 2011; Morrison et al. 2012).  Resource companies have been loath to invest arguing 
that they already pay royalties, grants and taxes to government and they and their 
employees should be treated equitably and hence receive the same level of infrastructure 
and services as other communities and towns.  However, the intransigence of government, 
the strong demand for Australia’s resources and high global prices have prompted resources 
companies to fill the gaps in services and infrastructure, especially in remote areas.  As a 
result, growth is rarely scheduled in these communities and there has been limited co-
ordination and planning between resource companies and government (Gramling and 
Brabant 1986; Haslam McKenzie et al. 2009; Morrison et al. 2012).   Further, when global 
markets rise resource companies are usually able to outbid smaller businesses and service 
providers for labour, housing and other necessities, limiting competition through sheer size 
and domination and creating a mono-economy.  This often results in the marginalisation of 
those who are not involved in the industry (Langton 2010; Taylor 2012)  and the eventual 
transition to resource dependency (Freudenburg 1992; Stedman et al. 2004; Humphreys et 
al. 2007).   
In response to inadequate infrastructure and accommodation shortages, mining companies 
have taken advantage of tax incentives and the relative efficiencies, flexibility and low costs 
of air travel to establish long distance commuting (LDC) workforce arrangements.   The 




temporary nature, close to the mine site.  In return for extended shifts and compressed 
work weeks (where workers work longer shifts, compressing their standard work week in 
fewer days, enabling them to have more leisure time in their time off), LDC workers usually 
receive a higher wage or salary.  The use of non-residential workforce involving block shifts 
and long distance commuting (LDC) is now common in the resources sector and associated 
industries across Australia. 
In Australia in particular, there is considerable debate regarding the socio-economic costs 
and benefits associated with LDC or transient workers (Haslam McKenzie 2011; AEC Group 
2012; Chamber of Minerals and Energy 2012; Tonts et al. 2012).  Fly-in fly-out (FIFO) work 
arrangements, in particular, utilised by many resource companies and increasingly other 
service providers, have attracted considerable antagonism.  Local government authorities 
and regional councils argue that LDC workers use hard (roads, water, sewage) and social 
(services such as health, police, leisure) infrastructure for which they pay very little (see 
submissions to the House of Representatives FIFO Enquiry, 2013).  Small business is 
adversely affected when ‘overflow’ accommodation such as hotels, caravan parks and camp 
grounds is fully occupied by contractors and resources service industry workers, thus 
limiting tourism, casual visitors and other business people (AEC Group 2012; Morrison et al. 
2012).  There are counter arguments however.  Resources peak industry organisations argue 
vigorously that their investment in purpose-built accommodation facilities reduces pressure 
on government, community infrastructure and services (Acil Tasman 2011; Chamber of 
Minerals and Energy 2012).  Mine licence agreements usually require significant community 
and infrastructure investment by the resources companies and they view this contribution 
as both a corporate social responsibility but also a payback for the disruption to local 
communities.  A further disincentive to the establishment or expansion of townships is the 
cyclical vagaries of international resource prices and the increasingly shorter mine life of 
many projects (Haslam McKenzie et al. 2013).  LDC arrangements are a cost effective means 
of supplementing a skilled labour force (Lawrie et al. 2011) and are likely to be the only 
practical arrangement for very remote sites and for operations with only short to medium 
time horizons.  The resources labour force is increasingly mobile (Thompson 2013).  Many 
workers prefer long distance commuting because it gives them and their families’ flexibility 
and choice regarding where and how they live (Haslam McKenzie et al. 2013).  
Resources companies’ workforce strategies are likely to have considerable social and 
economic implications in small, remote communities, but local and state governments also 
have a role in setting local and regional development policy objectives and planning 
regimes.  The challenge is to provide an integrated policy environment that is responsive to 
industry needs while simultaneously ensuring the environmental and social sustainability 
needs of the broader community are met.   It is important for government agencies and 
community decision-makers to have access to the appropriate tools to accurately measure 
and assess the impacts and contributions of different workforce patterns to local 




The Pilbara Region in Boom Conditions 
The Pilbara region is responsible for a major portion of Australia’s production, value, exports 
and investments of extraction industries commodities, particularly iron-ore and LNG 
(Department of Mines and Petroleum 2011).  In the decade 2001 to 2011, the Pilbara 
region, stretching over 400,000 square kilometres, recorded the largest and fastest 
population increase (59%) outside of Perth, the State’s capital city (Australian Bureau of 
Statistics 2012).  Importantly however, the growth was coming off a low base in 2001 of 
39,461 people for the entire region.  The increase in population was entirely due to the scale 
of the resources boom which has placed enormous pressure on housing, infrastructure, 
human resources and public service provision (Senate Select Committee 2008; Haslam 
McKenzie et al. 2009).  It is estimated that an additional 55,000 long distance commuter 
workers, especially fly-in/fly-out (FIFO) from Perth, are also working in the Pilbara (Chamber 
of Minerals and Energy 2012).  After decades of neo-liberal  government policies with a 
central aim being the efficient allocation of resources, there was almost no government 
financial support for new town development (Storey 2001).  The Pilbara had experienced 
substantial project-to-project led investment by the international resources sector with 
limited co-ordination causing cumulative impacts on local and state infrastructure and 
community resources.  This project-led development occurred in the context of a reactive 
State government with limited strategic response applied to crisis levels of societal impact in 
the region (Singleton and Haslam McKenzie 2008).  The scale of the recent boom placed 
enormous pressure on infrastructure, human resources and public service provision. As 
noted earlier, accommodation, or rather its lack, was a critical weakness.  Demand for 
housing and a slow supply response forced prices to rise by around 200 per cent in five 
years (Pilbara Development Commission 2004; Pilbara Industry's Community Council 2008; 
Senate Select Committee on Housing Affordability in Australia 2008).  These price increases 
had a detrimental effect on the labour market, particularly for those firms trying to attract 
staff from outside the mining industries. The lack of suitable, affordable housing has been 
cited as the biggest challenge facing businesses and the Pilbara region more generally 
(Haslam McKenzie et al. 2009), thus limiting economic diversity and the opportunity for the 
towns to develop mature, functioning housing and labour markets.   
A range of mostly government reports over a thirty year period from 1974 regarding 
projected future land and infrastructure requirements have examined the opportunities for 
future development and in some cases, modelled the implications on industry and regional 
development if land was not made available. It would appear however, that despite the 
recognition of a need to address land availability and planning for future industry, 
population and infrastructure needs in the Pilbara, the plethora of reports were largely 
ignored until it was too late.  Rather than delivering a steady supply of developable land, 
government has tended to react to market signals. 
Key themes emerging from an Australian Housing and Urban Research Institute study 




planning that acknowledges the temporal and spatial characteristics of the resources 
industry. It emphasised the specific context of mining towns and the importance of 
governance structures that actively engage all the key stakeholders in determining 
appropriate local and regional housing solutions.  It also stressed the need for flexible 
approaches to housing density, diversity and adaptability in order to respond to changing 
housing needs over time.  This and other reports (Rolfe et al. 2007; Esteves 2008; Hajkowicz 
et al. 2011; Lawrie et al. 2011) acknowledge the importance of appropriate housing 
strategies (and the necessary services and utilities to support them,) for mining towns which 
take into account the immediate housing needs of a community as well as the longer term 
scenarios for the town and the region.  Timing of development was identified as critical, 
given the often complex and time consuming approvals processes that must be undertaken, 
most of which are sequential rather than simultaneous.  The involvement and co-ordination 
of multiple government agencies and some community based organisations, especially in 
boom conditions, creates delays and heightened levels of frustration for developers, 
resource companies, local authorities and residents.  Native Title clearance on land can take 
up to ten years for Crown Land to be released to the market (Haslam McKenzie and Rowley 
2013) and mining clearances and environmental approvals must all be attained before 
necessary infrastructure such as roads, power, sewage and water supply can be installed.  
The level of remoteness is also likely to add to planning approval complexity, cost schedules 
and delivery.  Such delays are critical when housing markets are required to respond to very 
rapid employment growth scenarios.   
The Pilbara is now too expensive for a range of past and potential residents; it is too 
expensive for most retirees, thus removing a large proportion of the volunteering sector and 
preventing the community functioning in a traditional manner.  Indigenous residents often 
live in overcrowded squalor in and around Roebourne.  The retail and service workforce 
who are not on high salaries report being pushed into tents, caravans or subletting garages 
for lack of affordable accommodation.  Due to long term housing and social infrastructure 
shortfalls in the Pilbara region over several decades, the communities complain of constant 
population churn, with most people and particularly families tending to stay in the region 
for only as long as a job lasts and then moving away because housing costs erode the high 
wages paid in the Pilbara.  Community leaders complain that there is limited sense of place 
or community commitment, thus contributing to a sense of transition and ‘shallowness’. 
The Pilbara Cities Initiative was therefore a very welcome, and many would argue, long 
overdue, regional economic development program with broad social benefits.  This initiative  
focused on transforming the two largest Pilbara towns, Karratha in the Shire of Roebourne 
and Port Hedland, in the Shire of Port Hedland (see Figure 1), channelling $1.2Au billion to 
upgrade their town centres, the capacity of the local utilities and services and the 
development of adequate housing and accommodation.  Not only are Port Hedland and 
Karratha both coastal towns with important port facilities for the iron-ore and salt industries 




distance commuting workforces.  A budget allocation was also made for the revitalisation of 
the Newman town centre in the Shire of East Pilbara; a small inland town and a hub for long 
distance commuting iron-ore workers.  As identified earlier, it would appear that these 
strategic developments have had only limited application in the case of Onslow. 
Onslow 
Onslow is a small remote, coastal town in the Pilbara Shire of Ashburton, 1,400 kilometres 
north of Perth.  As shown in Figure 1, it is located 83 kilometres off the main highway and 
the closest town, Karratha, is more than 300 kilometres distant.  The original town of 
Onslow was established in 1885 to support pastoral stations along the Ashburton River and 
goldmines in the hinterland.  Due to silting at the river mouth, the town was moved in 1925 
to its current location at Beadon Point 18 kilometres east along the coast.  In 2011, the 
census recorded the local population as 667 people, 27% of whom were Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander, a relatively high proportion of the local population.  The population 
had increased by 16% since the previous census taken in 2006, although the population 
recorded at the 2001 census show the population to be considerably higher with more than 
800 residents.  Due to its remoteness and isolation, Onslow has never been a big town.  It 
continues to support several pastoral stations, a small fishing industry and tourism during 
the winter months.  Until now, the largest local employer was Onslow Salt which produces 
approximately 2.5 million tonnes of salt per annum. 
The off-shore region around Onslow, the Carnarvon Basin, is estimated to hold 70% of 
Australia’s natural gas (Department of State Development 2011).  In 2011 Onslow was 
selected by a multi-national oil and gas consortia headed by Chevron as the most 
appropriate site for a large-scale liquefied nature gas hub for the Wheatstone gas field, after 
a lengthy feasibility assessment. It is projected that the project will create approximately 
6,500 direct and indirect jobs at the construction peak and a permanent operational 
workforce of 300 people when the first of the gas goes online in 2016.  This project will 
undoubtedly have complex and multifaceted impacts on such a small, remote community, 
which will likely be amplified by the extreme remoteness of Onslow.  Nonetheless, the 
project has been welcomed by most people who anticipate infrastructure upgrades and 
enhanced services with an increased population.  Rather than a State Agreement, the 
project is administered by a State Development Agreement which is not ratified by an Act of 
Parliament but rather, a series of contractual agreements between the government and 
corporate partners.  Onslow is one of the first projects not to be underpinned by a State 
Agreement, but rather, a contractually based State Development Agreement. 
There has been some apprehension regarding growth, particularly at the local level, with 
concerns that the negative impacts experienced by other Pilbara communities associated 
with rapid expansion must be avoided.  This was underscored when, in 2009, contractors 
associated with the early stages of the project bought several houses in the town and there 




Onslow residents were concerned that the price of accommodation would go the same way 
as Karratha, Newman and Port Hedland, squeezing out those not involved in the resources 
and related industries.   Once the project was formally ratified, Chevron committed to work 
with the community to ensure the potential negative impacts of growth would be minimised 
while enhancing opportunities for the enduring community value from gas expansion into 
the town.  As part of the formal Development Application plan, the Wheatstone Workforce 
Management Plan required that Chevron employees and those of their contractors sign a 
‘Code of Conduct’ agreement to ensure appropriate behaviour in the town.  
In 2011, the Onslow Community Reference Group (CRG) was formed, constituted of Shire, 
community and company representatives with members co-opted from state government 
agencies, and more recently, contractors.  Community reference groups have been used by 
Chevron in the Pilbara with some success as a means to formalise community engagement 
strategies.  It established the Gorgon CRGs in Onslow and Karratha in 2005. The Onslow 
CRG, comprising of community, local government and regional body representatives, 
consented to become a Chevron Onslow CRG in February 2008. CRG meetings are held 
every two months to discuss the Project’s progress and update the community on the 
Wheatstone and Gorgon Expansion (a large gasfield further north) projects, share 
community engagement activities and provide a forum to air concerns, facilitate  feedback 
and generally enhance communication between corporate activities and the community.   
Bechtel, an engineering, construction and project management company, has been 
contracted by Chevron to develop the downstream operations for the Wheatstone LNG 
project.  Bechtel is committed to growing local economies around its operations and 
honouring Chevron’s social license to operate.  Consequently, an early decision was made, 
in consultation with the community, to separate the project, and hence its impacts, from 
the town.  Ashburton North, an area of 8,000 hectares and 12 kilometres from the town is 
the industrial area site chosen for the multi-user port, a 3,800 bed village and the onshore 
processing facility.  Initially this separation from the town was welcomed, but as time has 
gone on, the Onslow business community complain they receive little in the way of 
increased business due to the contained nature of the project’s living arrangements.   
On the company side, it is not easy to contract work to local suppliers because of the scale 
of development for the LNG plant.  Local people seeking work opportunities were required 
to meet strict contractor readiness requirements including health, safety and environment 
pre-requisites.  In such a small community, there are not a lot of opportunities to spend 
locally without compromising service delivery to the community.  For example, earlier in 
2012 there were community complaints that contractors were purchasing fuel from the only 
service station leaving the isolated town’s fuel supply vulnerable.  Similarly, when a cyclone 
threatened, the community criticised contractors for overwhelming the only supermarket 




is difficult to balance the commitment to ‘buy local’ without incurring ‘resource 
dependency’ or compromising long term residents’ access to goods and services.   
The company and its contractors have made other commitments to the community through 
the social impact package, negotiated between the local government and the state.  The 
Shire of Ashburton has taken the view that this is a rare opportunity to garner for the 
community a range of infrastructure and services which are unlikely to be provided by state 
government for such a small, remote community. The Shire has consequently prepared a 
social impact package adequate for a town of 3,000 people, (more than triple the current 
population), “rather than providing for adequate infrastructure suitable for the short term” 
(Onslow Community Reference Group 2011a) based on comprehensive community 
consultation.  Chevron has committed to provide approximately $187 million towards 
community infrastructure and public infrastructure with an expectation that government 
will also contribute to these infrastructure projects.  The social infrastructure projects 
Chevron has agreed to support include: 
 Airport 
 Four Mile Creek picnic area 
 Community Development Fund 
 Onslow Access Road 
 Town Master Plan and improvements 
 Wheatstone Public Visitors Centre; customer service centre; visitors centre, Council 
chambers and library 
 Onslow Aquatic and Recreational Centre 
 Old Onslow Conservation and Tourism Development 
 
The critical service infrastructure projects Chevron has agreed to support include: 
 Power station 
 Water supply – desalination plant 
 Health services ‐ hospital expansion and refurbishment 
 Wastewater services expansion 
 Onslow Road upgrade 
 Land development – new residential subdivision 
 Housing for Government workers 
 Waste management – new site 
 Expansion of School and Childcare 
 Emergency Services expansion 
 
For most of the projects, Chevron will provide funding to other parties to deliver the 
projects and will take a ‘fund and assure’ role.  For example, Chevron will provide $22 
million to the Department of Health to assist the upgrade of the Onslow hospital, and $30 
million to the Shire of Ashburton to upgrade the airport.  Many of these commitments, in 




would be the sole responsibility of the government.  Without this gas project, it is very 
unlikely that the government would fund these upgrades for such a small community. 
However, despite this project being in the planning stages for more than three years with 
strong indications that it would go ahead more than a year before final ratification by the 
company, the Western Australian government does not appear to have heeded earlier 
advice regarding co-ordinated or timely infrastructure provision, particularly power and 
water supply and land banking for housing and commercial development.  Within months of 
the construction phase commencing at Ashburton North, power and particularly adequate 
water supply became critical issues for the project and the community at Onslow.  While the 
company has undertaken to provide its own water for the gas plant through the 
construction of a desalination plant, its installation is still years away. In the meantime 
however, the State government’s commitments to provide power and water for the town 
have lagged and the situation has become critical since the construction workforce has 
placed unplanned-for pressure on local water supplies.  The State utility, Water Corporation, 
indicated in 2011 they expect to address water issues by 2014, by increasing the uptake of 
water from the Cane River.  The community is unsatisfied given that the BHP Billiton 
Macedon Project has planned for that additional water capacity.  BHP Billiton is currently 
drawing water from an aquifer but indications suggest that this is not a sustainable solution.  
In early 2013 the Water Corporation and Horizon Power (a State power utility) each stated 
at an Industry Forum in Onslow they would be able to provide interim supplies to bolster 
power and water supplies to meet need.  However, it would appear that the State has 
decided not to follow through on these offers, but rather, to avoid the cost risk associated 
with these upgrades, has shifted the responsibility to Chevron, effectively seeking to bring 
forward Chevron’s power and water upgrade obligations.  Chevron has not planned for the 
construction of this infrastructure yet, and does not have the necessary approvals or 
corporate imprimatur.  Without the government making its contribution, development will 
be thwarted, creating a classic ‘chicken and egg’ scenario.  In the meantime, the liveability 
of the town is declining and community more broadly is experiencing frustration and 
growing concern at the impasse.   
Furthermore, it would also appear that the sequencing of land release has not been 
carefully planned.  The Department for State Development began the projections for 
population growth and government services, (power supply, schools, health infrastructure, 
emergency response, waste management and water supply) for Onslow after the project 
was announced in 2011.  It has indicated that there is a five year plan to implement the 
infrastructure and services required (Onslow Community Reference Group 2011b).  
Industrial land is likely to be released before residential land because water and power are 
not in place, but it is residential land that is necessary to accommodate the workforce 
necessary for the development of the industrial land and infrastructure.  The company and 




temporary accommodation – exactly the scenario the Onslow community was keen to avoid 
prior to the announcement of the project.   
The Minutes from the June 2011 meeting of the Onslow Community Reference Group 
(2011c) indicate that the presence of temporary and transient worker accommodation in 
Onslow drew mixed responses from the community despite the Shire agreeing to transient 
worker accommodation in the town and minor amendments being made to Shire policy.  
The decision to agree to transient worker accommodation was to encourage the workforce 
to be part of the local community, encourage greater expenditure in the town and increase 
contribution to community infrastructure and services.  The community was adamant it did 
not want poorly designed, low quality, donga-style accommodation.  However, appropriate 
land was not available, despite Landcorp, the government land development agency being 
approached to provide a service workers’ camp.  Once again, tardy land release by the State 
government has created bottlenecks.  However, an innovative compromise has been 
achieved.  With the Discovery Holiday (caravan) Park almost full, three large tourism boats, 
transferred from the Queensland Great Barrier Reef have been moored in the Beadon Creek 
with accommodation capacity for more than 100 workers.  These boats, referred to as 
‘floatels’ or ‘boatels’ are largely self-contained, providing their own dock, water and waste 
management (see Figure 3). 
Figure 3: ‘Floatel’ worker accommodation in Onslow, 2012. 
 
Despite attempts to contain speculation and minimise the negative impacts, local residents 
complain that Onslow is changing with limited opportunity for local entrepreneurs to take 
advantage of opportunities due to a large multi-national company with limited empathy for 
small-town Australian conditions, tardy land release, hold ups with native title processes 
and the provision of utilities; the same problems which have been experienced by the other 
Pilbara communities and which have stymied orderly regional economic development 




that gas production and sales will take longer to offset the high production costs causing 
concern for shareholders, banks and international interests.  Corporate threats were not 
taken seriously by the Western Australian government in 2008 and concessions given by the 
Northern Territory government to Inpex, a Japanese oil and gas company, meant that 
valuable business bypassed Western Australia, even though the gas reserves are off the 
Western Australian coast.  While Chevron and other oil and gas companies have committed 
to Western Australia for the time being, rising costs, poor infrastructure planning and 
stalling productivity do not auger well for the future unless these issues are urgently 
addressed.   
Conclusion 
The small, remote community of Onslow has the potential to play an important role in the 
next phase of Australia’s resource development through the establishment of a gas hub on 
its perimeter.  The local community is keen to garner from the development, a population 
base and infrastructure which will bolster its long term sustainability.  When Onslow was 
first mooted as a possible hub, the community was determined to preserve the features of 
the town which they valued and consequently worked with government and corporate 
representatives to plan for enduring benefits and avoid the problems experienced in other 
Pilbara communities due to rapid growth with inadequate planning and poor infrastructure.  
The company has worked closely with the community and government as it moved through 
the approvals process ensuring that the goals were clear, anticipating that with mutually 
agreed commitments, economic, social and environmental sustainability would be the 
outcome.    
It would appear however, that as the construction phase gathers pace, cracks are emerging 
in what was envisaged would be a respectful community engagement whereby all parties 
(the community, local and State government and the corporate partners) clearly understood 
the different goals, aspirations and priorities.   The State government has been slow to 
honour its key leadership and partner role and international market imperatives and 
government/corporate manoeuvring to avoid expensive infrastructure obligations have left 
the community with less than satisfactory outcomes: escalating housing costs, business 
closures and power and water shortages.  Factors including access to power, water, health 
and education services, the natural and built environment and social connectedness, all 
have important bearings on business performance, people’s quality of life, the social 
functioning of communities and worker and resident retention.   
Government has a critical role in providing leadership on these issues.   “Prescient planning, 
leadership, mutual respect between governments, resource companies, their employees 
and local community, and open and ongoing communication are imperative if towns 
dominated by mining and the extractive industries are to build resilience, thus enabling 
them to successfully change and endure” (Measham et al. 2013 ).  If this is not achieved, the 




people, businesses and the region as has been witnessed elsewhere and which has been 
described as ‘the paradox of plenty’ and ‘the resource curse’.  Furthermore, without a 
ratified State Agreement, governance is based on contractual agreements rather than 
legislated foundations and is therefore open to legal interpretation and manoeuvring.  
It is evident that companies and governments operate on entirely different timeframes and 
within unalike governance structures.  Corporations, even large multinationals, must be 
responsive to market needs and environmental conditions or risk commercial failure. 
Governments on the other hand, respond to a widely divergent range of ideas, concepts and 
approaches, shaped by policy and decision-making processes with the accompanying 
influences, challenges and constraints of a democratic government.  They are deliberative, 
negotiative and networked.   Despite the best of intentions, it appears that the differences 
are intractable and many in Onslow are wondering where is the enduring community value 
from this development?    
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